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Abstract:
This paper examines the choice of an insurance contract when
insurers might default on indemnity claims. In particular, we show
that more-risk-averse preferences do not necessarily lead to the
purchase of higher levels of insurance coverage in such situations.
Our results are shown not to apply in situations where the insured
receives a premium refund for nonperforming insurance policies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Insurance purchased at "fair" prices is usually considered a
method of reducing a particular financial risk. However, this need
not be the case when insurance policies have a possibility of not
paying indemnities for their claims. If there exists a chance that
the individual will not be indemnified following a loss claim, then
the purchase of insurance also introduces a new risk, which is the
risk of losing premium dollars as well as experiencing the loss.
Since a higher degree of risk aversion implies a greater relative
emphasis on downside risk, an increase in the level of risk aversion,
ceteris paribus
,
will not necessarily lead to the purchase of a higher
level of insurance coverage—a result which stands in marked contrast
to the usual insurance literature. The purpose of this paper is to
present this result more formally.
Types of situations in which a nonpayment of insurance claims is
possible include the following:
(i) Insurer insolvency. In this case, the insurer has a
probability of defaulting on claims,
(ii) Questionable perils and hazards. Although most claims are
clearly valid or not, some occurrences are questionable
within the legal scope of which losses are covered and
which are not.
(iii) Contract conditions. Certain losses may not be covered
under prescribed conditions. For example, there may be a
waiting period before some loss is covered so that an
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occurrence during the waiting period is essentially
uninsured.
Each of the above possibilities might be known by the insured and
reflected in lower insurance premiums; but the insurance market still
remains incomplete since these losses cannot generally be covered.
The model we use is essentially that of Doherty and Schlesinger
(1986). Readers interested in a more complete development of tbe
model are referred to this paper.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a risk-averse individual with preferences expressed by
the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(W) , U'>0, U"<0. We
consider a simple three-state model in which no loss occurs with
probability q , a loss that can be indemnified occurs with probability
q 9 ,
and a loss that cannot be indemnified occurs with probability q„.
The size of the loss itself is assumed to be the same in states 2 and
3. Thus, our model is a variation of the simple two-state, loss vs.
no-loss model, modified to account for the chance of nonpayment. The
model abstracts from any potential moral-hazard and/or adverse-
selection problems, and the probabilities q , q and q. are assumed to
be fixed and known. We should also point out that states 2 and 3 are
identical when no insurance coverage is purchased.
The consumer may protect against the loss by purchasing an
insurance policy which promises to pay a fixed proportion a of the
loss if it occurs. The complication is, of course, that there is a
q„/(l-q ) probability that the insurer does not pay on a loss claim.
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The individual's expected utility following the purchase of insurance
is
where
EU = qjUCWj) + q
2
U(W
2
) + q 3
U(W
3
> (1)
W = A - P
W=A-P-L+aL
W = A - P - L
A = initial wealth level
P = insurance premium
L = magnitude of potential loss.
Insurance prices are assumed to be proportional to the expected
insurance payment so that
P = maq L where m >_ 1. (2)
Note that insurance prices also reflect the probability of non-
payment since they don't include q . Since we assume the premium to
be given, we do not concern ourselves with the relationship between m
and q_ here.
The consumer's objective is to maximize expected utility (1) sub-
ject to the price schedule (2). The first-order condition is
|p = U'(W2 ) - [BU'CWj) + CU'(W3 )] = 0, (3)
where
B = mq /(1-mq ) and C = mq /(1-mq ).
It is straightforward from (3) to show that full coverage is purchased
only when both q
3
= Q (a zero chance of nonpayment) and m = 1
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(actuarially-f air insurance prices). Otherwise, less than full
coverage is purchased.
3. INCREASED RISK AVERSION
We now turn our attention to the main focus of the paper, namely
how insurance purchases are affected by the consumer's level of risk
aversion. To this end, let utility function V represent uniformly
more risk-averse preferences than U. By Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974),
there exists a concave function g such that V = g°U.
Consider now the marginal expected utility of V with respect to a,
evaluated at the optimal insurance level under U, a*.
dEV
da
- g'[U(W
2
)] U'(W
2
) (4)
- {g'HKWj)] BU'Cwp +g'[u(w
3
)] cu»(w
3 )}
We can assume, without loss of generality, that g'[U(W )] = 1. Thus,
by the concavity of g,
g'llKW^] < 1 < g»[U(W
3
)]. (5)
Comparing (4) with (3), it follows from (5) that dEV/da can be
either positive or negative at a*. Thus, the optimal level of
insurance coverage can be either higher or lower with the more risk-
averse utility. This result stands in contrast to the more definitive
result that more coverage is always purchased (whenever possible)
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under more risk-averse preferences in models that don't allow for non-
payment of claims. Note that when nonpayment is impossible q =
and thus comparing (4) with (3) it is trivial to show that more
coverage is purchased under preferences V.
4. AN EXAMPLE
We consider the following example to demonstrate our point that it
is possible for a more risk-averse individual to purchase less
insurance coverage if there is a positive probability of not being
indemnified for a loss. Let us suppose the following utility
function
U(W) = -e~6W with 8 > 0. (6)
This function has the property that the individual's absolute risk
aversion as defined by Arrow and Pratt is given by the exponential
coefficient 8
.
In our example, 8 will vary from 0.5 to 4.5. We further assume
that A = 3.43, L = 1.43, m = 1.3 and q = 0.8. This implies a thirty
percent loading on the net-premium and a loss-probability of 0.2. We
will consider three different cases: q~ = 0, q„ = 0.02, and
q_ = 0.06. The first case describes what standard insurance-economic
theory normally assumes, that the insured will always be indemnified
if a loss occurs. In the second and third case, a ten or thirty per-
cent chance is respectively assumed that a loss occurs but the
insurance company refuses to reimburse the individual.
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Computer simulation results are plotted in Figure 1. The upper
curve shows the optimal level of insurance coverage for the case where
q = 0. As is well known, a* increases as risk aversion increases.
Insert Figure about here
The optimal level of coverage is 0.52 for 3 = 0.5 and increases to
0.95 as 3 grows to 4.5. The second and third curves correspond to the
cases where there is a positive probability that the insurer will not
indemnify the insured's loss-claim. When q = .02, the optimal level
of insurance coverage is increasing to a maximum of approximately 0.77
at 3 = 1.75 and decreases afterwards as absolute risk aversion. Simi-
lar results are seen to obtain for the case where q„ = .06 as well.
5. "MONEY BACK GUARANTEES"
There is a provision in some actual life insurance contracts that
suggests an interesting extension of our model. Under this provision,
there is a return of the premium paid if the insured dies and the cause
of death is excluded under the policy. Although we know of no similar
provisions in property and liability insurance contracts, It is inter-
esting to examine whether unambiguous comparative-static results hold
(with respect to the degree of risk aversion) for the case where the
premium is returned to the policyholder following the nonpayment of an
insurance claim—a "money back guarantee" of sorts. In this case, the
actuarially-based premium is given by
P = (moq
2
L)/(l-q ). (7)
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It is straightforward to show that
^ a - mq.U'OO + [q. + (l-in)qJU'(Wj. (8)da li l l i
From the proportionality condition (8) we see that the sign of dEU/da
is independent of q~. It follows trivially from (8) that full coverage
is purchased whenever prices are actuarially fair (m=l) and partial
coverage is purchased when prices are "loaded" (m>l), thus restoring
the usual results of rational insurance purchasing (cf. Mossin (1968)).
It is also straightforward to show from (8) that strictly-raore-risk-
averse preferences would lead to the purchase of a higher level of
insurance coverage, unless of course in=l , in which case full coverage
3
is purchased with both utility functions.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that increased risk aversion does not necessarily
imply a higher level of insurance coverage when insurers can default on
indemnity payments. However, we should caution against making too much
of our results in a practical sense. Our previous example shows an
inverse relationship between the degree of risk aversion and the level
of insurance coverage only for levels of risk aversion that are much
higher than levels thought to be empirically valid. The probabilities
of nonpayment by insurers in the example seem to also be unrealisti-
cally high. We were unable to obtain an example with parameter values
in more realistic ranges. Thus, while we have shown that it is theore-
tically possible to see such inverse relationships between insurance
levels and risk aversion, we might not expect to observe such results
very often as a matter of practice.
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FOOTNOTES
Second-order conditions are not trivially satisfied, but are assumed
to hold. For a discussion of the complexities involved in the second-
order conditions, the reader is referred to Schlesinger (1985).
2
For a more complete analysis of insurance levels, see Doherty and
Schlesinger (1986).
3
This is accomplished by substituting V = g o U for U in the right-
hand-side of the proportionality condition (8) and differentiating.
Evaluating dEV/da at the optimal coverage level for U shows that coverage
should be increased.
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